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EDITORIAL 
The BAROMETER is a student newspaper for the exchange of ideas and 
information concerning the development and improvement of the 
professional environment at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
***************** 
"The "New Navy" cannot and will not operate successively without 
freedom of expression (and knowledgable criticism where warranted) 
within the officer corps, but the young officer entering the service 
must C01!le to understand that the "entry-fee" for this arena of 
discussion is not only demonstrated ability but also proven 
obedience and loyalty." 
Command At Sea by Rear Admiral Harley F. Cope, USN (RET.). 
As the second quarter of the BAROMETER under the present Editors draws to a close a 
few comments are appropriate. Our efforts to provide articles of interest on a wide range 
of subject matter have resulted in both favorable comments and constructive criticism. 
Lack of student participation in the expression and exchange of ideas has been a big 
disappointment. On the whole the wide cross-section of specialties here at the Post-
graduate School represents the heart of the career officer corps that the Navy is staking 
its future on. The loyalty, obedience and vast professional experience of the students 
serve as excellent qualifications for entry into the arena of discussion as quoted above. 
Many have desired to express their opinions on the numerous problems and controversial 
issues that plague the services today, but lack of time to write these ideas down and 
unwillingness to sign their name have prevented them. If we think that the Soviet Navy 
with its modern advanced ships and hardware is a threat, so are indecisiveness and apathy. 
EDITORIAL COMMENT: Recently Canada unified its Armed Forces in an effort to reduce its 
defense spending and eliminate redundant support establishments. An evaluation of this 
decision and progress to date are given in this week's Feature "How Unification Worked for 
Ca""ada" which appeared in the April 1973 issue of the ARMED FORCES JOURNAL. 
FEATURE: HOW UNIFICATION WORKED FOR CANADA 
"Canada had three services before 1968: Royal Canadian Navy, Canadian Army, and Royal 
Canadian Air Force. On 1 February of that year the three Services ceased to exist and were 
unified into one: the Canadian Armed Forces. Three years later, its 20,000 members wore 
the same dark green uniform. 
There was a lot more to it, of course, than just one name and one uniform. A common 
headquarters had to be set up, as did functional (rather than Service) operational and 
support commands. Every aspect of administration and logistics had to be combined. It took 
nine years to complete the planned changes and, according to some officers, it will take a 
good while longer to shake down the new setup into a smooth-running organization. 
The idea of a unified Canadian Armed Forces was viewed by many quarters at home and 
abroad as an exciting new experiment (and by some Canadians as a crazy one). But the 
movers and shakers, like Minister of Defence Paul Hellyer, who organized it, were dead 
serious and it has been a real, if controversial, thing from the beginning. 
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Led by tradition-conscious Rear Admiral William Landymore, who said that unification 
would destroy the forces, Canada had its "revolt of the Admirals" just as Washington did 
during the 1949 unification fight. And Canada's was for many of the same reasons. The 
difference was that in Canada the admirals lost and those in revolt retired. Two of their 
less consequential bones of contention reputedly had to do with loss of their traditional 
navy blue uniforms and naval rank titles, both world-wide identifying marks of the 
sailorman. 
They did win a compromise on the rank titles. By what must be one of the few anomalies 
of Canadian unification, flag officers continue to be called by the Arabic word "Admiral", 
which means lord of the sea, and not "General" which originally meant a generalist, able 
to command anything. Other Navy rank titles also were retained. 
The air arm had its naysayers as well. Retired RCAF Air Vice Marshal R.A. Cameron 
scathingly wrote in Navy magazine a few years ago: "I think the best advice on whether 
to unify or not would be don't-unless you're desperate for confusion. However, if you ~ 
insist, then for heaven's sake, don't be silly about ranks and uniform. 
Army objectors apparently have been good soldiers about unification since no public 
outbursts were detected by AFJ. Privately, however, many will cite specifics where 
unification isn't working up to expectations and complain that the organization is still 
a bit mucked up. Some also grumble about the loss of regimental uniforms and loss to the 
regular forces of certain regiments like the Black Watch of Canada. 
However, all the famous old regiments continue in the militia (reserves) and Army 
service dress was much the same except for certain regimental headgear. In a permissive 
capitulation, regimental, service, and corps dress uniforms may still be worn on 
"appropriate occasions" and regimental and corps distinctive insignia is worn on the new 
green. uniform. 
It was about 10 years ago that Canada began to take the hard look at its armed services-
a look that the Vietnam War has delayed in the u.S. until now. Defence Minister Hellyer 
delivered a bill of indictment which included the following: 
·Defense costs were rising inordinately while personnel seemed excessive and 
many activities were triplicated. 
·The portion of the defense dollar going to capital equipment-purchase of guns, 
ships and planes-had fallen to a low of 13.6% compared with 42.9% 10 years before. 
·There were no unified functional commands and top level decision-making was slow 
and cumbersome, complicated by over 200 tri-Service committees often working at cross 
purposes. For example, during the Congo crisis the UN asked Canada for 300 radio 
technicians. The Army didn't have enough to send while at the same time the Air Force 
was discharging them. Decision-making alone took three days: it then took 12 days to 
find and transport the 300 to the Congo. 
·Over nine years, more than $9 million was spent developing Bobcat, a tracked 
armored personnel carrier, ahead of in time and perhaps superior to the u.S. Ml13. By 
1963 the Army had run out of funds and stopped the project. After Canada scrapped the 
project both the U.S. and Britain, who had been watching Bobcat with a great deal of 
interest, went into production with their own APCs. Canada has since bought 1,200 
M1l3s from the U.S. The official view was that under unification this needn't have 
happended. 
·The Army, Navy and RCAF couldn't even talk to each other on the same radio 
nets and frequencies. 
GOALS AND A PLAN 
Hellyer t , goals through integration/unification included: 
·Reduction of overhead costs to permit purchase of more modern equipment. 
·Improvement of top level decision making and management. 
·Development of more flexible and efficient forces for the challenges of a 
modern changing world. 
·Allowance for more diverse and satisfying careers for military men. 
The need for integration/unification was presented to Parliament and the nation in 
the 1964 Defence White Paper. The integration part of the plan became law on 1 August 
and abolished the jobs of Chariman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the three Service 
chiefs and replaced them with one Chief of the Defense Staff with the full authority of 
his four predecessors. Over the next two years, phase one of integration saw the merger 
of the three Service headquarters with common operations, personnel, logistics, and finance 
branches. 
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FROM 11 COMMANDS TO 5 
Phase two, also completed in 1966, was the reduction of the three Services' 11 
commands (Navy's two coastal, Army's four geographical, and the Air Forces' five 
functional" to five functional commands combining Service elements. They were Mobile, 
Maritime, Training, Air Transport and Air Defence. This exercise has been described 
officially as the "most difficult" stage of the program. 
The final step of Hellyer's program was unification of the armed forces and forming 
"a single-uniform, single-flag, single commander force with one rank structure, and 
one set of regulations". Legally it was implemented on 1 February 1968 and the process 
has been pretty well completed by now. Further changes are merely adjustments growing 
out of experience with the new organization and procedures. 
CANADIAN FORCES COMBAT STRENGTH 
Land: 9 Infantry Battalions 
3 Armored Battalions 
3 Artillery Battalions 







3 Operational Support Ships 
4 All-Weather Fighter Squadrons 
1 Electronic Warfare Squadron 
5 Fighter-Attack Squadrons 
7 Maritime Patrol Squadrons 
2 ASW Helicopter Squadrons 
6 Helicopter Squadrons 
5 Transport Squadrons 
4 Transport & Rescue Squadrons 
18,000 men organized in approximately 
19 armored, 50 infantry, and 13 art iller, 
battalions plus supporting units, 
all under strength. 
3,000 men in 16 units. 
1,000 men in 6 light transport squadrons 
Goals set for integration/unification have generally been achieved but in some 
cases not to the extent desired. More money has been available for capital expenditures 
but not Hellyer's hoped for 25% of the budget. The troops seem happy enough and career 
opportunities have broadened. Duplication (and triplication) has been cut and 
efficiency has been improved in most areas although the new procedures are still in a 
"shake down" period. 
Here is a summary of mixed results: 
·Troop strength was reduced from 121,000 in 1964 to 83,000 today (while Canada's 
units with NATO were cut from 10,000 to 5,000, other commitments stay the same). 
·The 1964 forces cost $1.7 billion. Today's budget is locked in at $1.8 billion 
for 1/3 fewer men nine years later. But the 1964 forces would cost $2.3 billion in 
1973 dollars; in 1963 dollars today's forces would cost only $1.3 billion. 
"The capital spending goal was set at 18% of the budget in 1967, 20% in 1970, 
and 25% in 1975. However, it still hovers around the 13% level. 
·Nevertheless, Hellyer's 1965 $1.5 billion new equipment want list has been fulfiiled 
with APCs, self-propelled guns, recon vehicles, fighter and transport aircraft, new 
destroyers and submarines, and new radios. 
·When the UN asked Canada's help in the Indo-Pakistan border dispute, the decisions 
were made in one 37-minute meeting; troops were on the way in 72 hours. 
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·In the October 1970 domestic crisis, decision-making was cut to 22 minutes; 
within 10 hours most of the 9,000 troops involved were in position. 
·Basic training camps were cut from 11 to two. 
·Specia1ized training schools were cut from 91 to 30. 
·Trade specia1y classifications were cut from 346 to 89. 
·Three intelligence services and three recruiting services were cut to one each. 
·Four war plan books were reduced to one coordinated defense plan. 
·One version of the Queen's Regulations was issued. 
·Three construction engineering branches were merged to one. 
·Headquarters personnel was cut 30%. 
·Bases closed were 18. 
WORKS FOR CANADA 
Probably no Canadian officer would say that unification has worked perfectly. It 
has had teething troubles. But it is working for Canada and improving all the time. In 
the words of one senior officer, "There are still problems to be ironed out. If anyone 
can set it right General Jimmy Dextraze (Chief of the Defence Staff) can." 
During the rougher ppriod of implementation, Canadian officers in opposition were said 
to have put part of the "'blame" on former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara. 
They said Hellyer came back from a stateside visit with McNamara enthusiastic about 
unification. Opponents theorize McNamara wanted to use the Canadian experience as a 
pilot project for possible U.S. reorganization. 
"If unification is so good", one Canadian officer asked back then, "why hasn't any 
other country adopted the idea?" Well, to AFJs limited knowledge at least three other 
relatively small regular armed forces have unified-not in every case with the same 
uniforms and ranks but with one headquarters, one chain of command, and one administrative 
and logistic support organization. They are Yugoslavia, Israel and Burma. And they 
did it before Canada." 
